Perpetual strategies in -calculus are analyzed from a semantical perspective. This is achieved using suitable denotational models, computationally adequate with respect to the observational (operational) equivalence, p , induced by perpetual strategies. A necessary and su cient condition is given for an !-algebraic lattice, isomorphic to the space of its strict continuous self-maps, to be computationally adequate w.r.t p . While many such models exist, it is shown, however, that none is fully abstract w.r.t. p . The computationally adequate lattice model D p is studied in detail. It is used to give a semantical proof of the Conservation Theorem for the -calculus, and to provide coinductive and mixed inductivecoinductive characterizations of p . The coinductive characterization allows to show that the term model of p is a denotational model; this yields a new characterization of perpetual redexes in -calculus. Key words: semantics, lambda calculus, observational equivalences, reduction strategies, normal forms
Introduction
In this paper we carry out a semantical investigation of perpetual strategies in -calculus. A perpetual strategy is a strategy which, for each term, computes an in nite reduction path, if it exists, and otherwise some nite path to normal form. Perpetual strategies have been extensively studied from a syntactical viewpoint, see e.g. 3, 6, 20, 22] ; but no study of perpetual strategies based on semantical tools has yet appeared in the literature. ? Work supported by EC WG \Gentzen". This paper can be seen as a further chapter in the general programme of investigating the denotational semantics of -calculi, some of whose earlier chapters are 3, 8, 9, 13, 10, 11] . We feel that also in this case semantical investigations provide very fruitful insights.
More speci cally, we use semantical techniques for deriving logical tools for reasoning on the observational equivalence, p , induced by any perpetual strategy ! p . This is the equivalence obtained by taking terms to be equal if we cannot tell them apart by observing that, for a given closing context, the strategy halts successfully when one is used to ll the hole but does not halt when the other one is used.
In e ect, the semantical investigations carried out in this paper are independent from the particular structure of the perpetual strategy ! p . They depend only on the judgement M + p N, whose intended meaning is \ the ! p strategy, starting from M, halts on N" or equivalently \M is strongly normalizing with normal form N". This is in line with the fact that we use standard extensional denotational semantics, and hence we do not describe the actual dynamics of the reduction strategy, but we account only for its statics.
We exploit extensively an S.O.S. axiomatization of M + p N.
Clearly, -reduction cannot be correct w.r.t. p . Hence, in order to develop equational tools for reasoning on p , one has to consider restricted notions of -reduction. The situation however is rather unsatisfactory. As we will see, the strongest restricted calculus, correct w.r.t. p , is as ine ective as p itself.
Moreover, in the case of ! p we do not even have the pleasant situation which arises for the call-by-value strategy, where at least there exists a correct calculus, i.e. Plotkin's v -calculus (see 19]), whose leftmost strategy coincides with ! v . So we shall not investigate any new restricted -calculus per se, but rather we will take a semantical approach and describe equational theories by means of suitable models. For the sake of completeness, however, we shall present an e ective restricted -calculus, the KN -calculus, and we shall brie y compare it with the K -calculus of B ohm and Intrigila (see 6]).
In order to develop semantical tools for establishing p , we need rst to introduce a suitable notion of denotational model called strict -model and then to nd useful examples of such models which are computationally adequate for p , i.e. models which induce semantical equivalences not coarser than p . The nature of restricted calculi essentially dictates that, in a lattice-theoretic setting, we have to consider strict function spaces. We focus on !-algebraic lattices, which are homeomorphic to the space of their continuous strict self-functions. We call such structures strict extensional -lattices. The main result of our denotational investigation is a necessary and su cient condition for a strict extensional -lattice to be computationally adequate for p . Such a condition allows to de ne easily a plethora of computationally adequate -models. The proof of su ciency is an interesting application of the computability technique.
The class of strict extensional -lattices is rather large. Nevertheless, we show that no such model can capture precisely p , i.e. none is fully abstract for p . This is yet another example of the mismatch between the essentially sequential nature of -calculus and the essentially parallel nature of Scott-continuous functions.
A particular strict extensional -lattice, D p , is useful in two ways. It provides immediately a proof of the, so called, Conservation Theorem forcalculus. This is the theorem which asserts that I -redexes are perpetual, i.e. if C ( x:M)N] is not strongly normalizing and x 2 FV (M) then also C M N=x]] is not strongly normalizing. Secondly, it is an essential tool in one of the proofs of the applicative characterization of p .
We give a coinductive (applicative) characterization of the observational equivalence p , by showing that, in testing for + p , we can restrict ourselves to applicative contexts. This allows us to derive a co-induction principle for establishing p in the line of 11]. We discuss various proof methods for establishing this (see e.g. 15, 16] ). We give details only of a semantical proof based on logical relations, which generalizes Pitts' technique for lazy strategies. This proof makes use of a mixed induction-coinduction principle for establishing p , based on D p . As a by product, it provides also an alternative proof of the computational adequacy of D p .
The applicative characterization of p is crucial in establishing that the term model of p is a denotational -model. This latter fact is used to provide a new characterization of perpetual redexes in -calculus, equivalent to that of Bergstra and Klop (see 5]).
Some of the constructions in this paper are closely linked to those appearing in an earlier paper of ours, 10], where we analyze the semantics of I-calculus, and to 8], where weakly normalizing terms are analyzed using intersection type theory.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we introduce perpetual strategies and observational equivalences. In Section 2 we introduce the notion of strict -model and discuss restricted -calculi such as the KN -calculus. In Section 3 we present two examples of denotational strict -models: the term model of p and the strict extensional -lattices. We derive also the new characterization of perpetual redexes. In Section 4 we give the necessary and su cient condition for a strict extensional -lattice to be a computationally adequate model for p ; we discuss examples, and we prove that fully abstract models of this kind do not exist. In Section 5 we prove coinduction and mixed induction-coinduction principles for establishing p . Final remarks and con-jectures appear in Section 6.
In this paper we use standard -calculus notions, notations, and facts without explicitly introducing them. Full details can be found in 3].
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Perpetual Strategies
We start by recalling basic notions and introducing a bit of notation.
A reduction strategy is a procedure for determining, for each -term, a speci c -redex in it to contract. A (deterministic) strategy can be formalized as a Given any perpetual strategy ! p , the set V al p is the set of -terms in normal form, and the judgement M + p N has also the natural reading of \the term M is -strongly normalizing and its normal form is N". Following Notice that the evaluation relation + p can be equivalently axiomatized using the following three rules: It is worth pointing out that the results in this paper concerning perpetual strategies will, in e ect, depend only on the property of the evaluation relation + p expressed by Theorem 1. This theorem can be viewed as a reformulation of well-known facts (see e.g. 14, 20] ). An alternative, more direct, proof of Theorem 1 can be obtained from the perpetuality of the strategy F 1 introduced by Barendregt, Bergstra, Klop, and Volken ( 3] ). This strategy reduces the leftmost -redex which is not contained in the operator of another redex, and which is either an I -redex, or a K -redex whose argument is a normal form. Other examples of e ective perpetual strategies can be found in 21] . From now onwards ! p will denote a generic perpetual strategy.
Observational and applicative equivalences
The observational pre-order induced by a perpetual strategy ! p is de ned as usual: syntax phrases are considered as black boxes, and a syntax phrase is said to approximate another if it is not possible to tell the rst apart from the second by observing that, for a given (closing) program context, the machine halts successfully when the rst is used as a subphrase, but does not halt when the other is used as a subphrase.
De nition 3 (p-observational preorder and equiv.) Let M; N 2 . (ii) The observational equivalence p is de ned by:
Notice that p is a congruence both w.r.t. application and w.r.t. abstraction.
Other important relations induced by a reduction strategy on -terms are the applicative pre-order and the corresponding applicative equivalence. These di er from the observational ones, in that we focus only on the behaviour of closed substitution instances of the terms in applicative (closed) contexts.
De nition 4 (p-applicative pre-order and equivalence) Let 2 Restricted -calculi and strict -models
When faced with the problem of establishing p we do not want to prove everything from rst principles, using always just induction on the length of the reduction paths dictated by the ! p strategy. These inductions are rather complex, unperspicuous and ultimately error-prone. Semantically signi cant reasoning principles are called for in order to factor out such complex tasks.
When trying to nd such e ective, logical tools for establishing observational equivalences, it is natural to consider rst equational theories derived from -calculus. We recall that an equational theory, on (i.e. ), is correct w.r.t. p if
Ordinary -conversion, = , is clearly incorrect w.r.t. p , consider e.g. x:x and its -expansion ( z:( xy:y)(zz))( z:( xy:y)(zz)). So, in order to nd correct calculi for p one has necessarily to look for suitable restrictions of = .
A similar situation arises in connection with the equivalence v determined by Plotkin's standard call-by-value reduction ! v , see 19, 9] . A possible cor-rect calculus, in this case, is Plotkin's call-by-value v -calculus, where correct redexes are those whose operand is a variable or an abstraction. In a way, also ! p has a call-by-value avour, in that any calculus correct for it has to be at least operand sensitive. Although Plotkin's v -conversion is far from being the largest correct notion of conversion included in v , nevertheless it is interesting in that M + v N if and only if M v -reduces to N following the leftmost v -strategy. However, one can easily see that there exists no restricted calculus which has such a property with respect to + p . Consider for instance ( yz:z)(xx): This should necessarily be a redex for any calculus, whose leftmost strategy be normalizing. But, there are many contexts where such a redex cannot be correctly contracted, e.g. ( x: ]) x:xx.
In this paper, however, we do not want to study new restricted calculi per se, but only to the extent to which the equational theories that they determine shed light on p . Hence, we prefer to take a semantical approach and try to describe equational theories by means of suitable denotational models, called strict -models. Strict -models are very closely related to the call-by-value -models, in the style of Hindley and Longo, introduced in 9].
We will see that interesting restricted calculi, correct for p , are those valid in strict -models. Some noteworthy examples will be introduced below.
De nition is the contextual closure of the relation generated by the axiom: We introduce now the main tool of our semantical investigation of perpetual strategies: strict -lattices. We will see that they are models also of the KN De nition 22 Let Then, computational adequacy follows immediately using Theorem 25 and the continuity of the operation of \ lling a hole" in a context. Suitably modifying the results in 17], one can see that Mendler's condition is necessary and su cient if restricted to type theories which are generated by a set of incomparable basic constants whose applicative behaviour is that of step functions. Mendler's syntactical condition is clearly not necessary when also the^operator is considered. Consider for instance again D bool , and take i 0 to be the same as above except on true, which now is i 0 (true) = D bool f false;true t f true;true . One can always take Comp(true) to be the least saturated set, and hence de ne an interpretation of T D bool in Sat. More investigation is necessary to determine whether there exists a condition in the style of Mendler for the general case.
Using the existence of a non-trivial strict extensional -lattice, which is computationally adequate for p So we can take as argument for P and Q, with a shorter reduction path, the term uv:C D u; v]; u; v]: 2 Notice that the above proof is the only proof in this paper, which strictly depends on the speci c nature of the e ective perpetual strategy F 1 .
On the other hand we have:
Theorem 39 Let 
In order to overcome this topological incompleteness, one could try to modify or to extend the class of strict extensional -lattices in various ways. Considering other classes of Scott-continuous functions with a common xed point should not make much di erence, while forcing us to have rather awkward interpretations. The same kind of counterexamples should work mutatis mutandis in these settings. It is immediate to see that, when discussing congruence with respect to application, we can restrict ourselves to the case that M; N; P; Q are all closed.
The congruence of app p w.r.t. -abstraction is not problematic. The congruence w.r.t. application is the real challenge.
In two papers by the second author, i.e. also for the lazy strategy. In 15], both methods are shown to apply to many strategies, including perpetual strategies. In 16], a general and uniform version of a purely syntactical method is presented, which generalizes to non-lazy or nondeterministic strategies Howe's congruence candidate method ( 12] The essential ingredient for proving 2 is a mixed induction-coinduction principle for the relation < . In order to derive this principle, we give an explicit inductive characterization of < in terms of relations < n D n 0 (C), where D n denotes the n-th projection of D in the inverse limit construction.
Here we apply the logical relation method to the model D p of De nition 34. De nition 44 A relation R D p 0 is called limit-closed if, whenever for all n 2 N (d n ; P) 2R, then also (d; P) 2R. 
Final Remarks
Syntactical approaches to perpetuality.
In the literature there are various, very successful, purely syntactical investigations of perpetual strategies, see e.g 5, 3, 20, 22, 21] . It would be very interesting to compare in detail these approaches to the one presented in this paper. This would contribute to the more general problem of understanding the rôle and the relevance of semantical tools in the study of -calculus.
B ohm and Intrigila's K -calculus.
In 6], B ohm and Intrigila raise the problem of characterizing calculi, and terms within particular calculi, which have the SN-normalization property, i.e. for which weak normalization implies strong normalization.
In this context they introduce the K -calculus, which is obtained by extending the set of I-terms with a constant K , representing the combinator K, whose -reduction rule is: K MN ! M ; if N is a closed term in K -normal form:
The side condition, in the above reduction, is clearly recursive, and one needs to spell out inductively, on the structure of terms, what is to be intended as a K -normal form. There is a natural compositional translation from to terms of the K -calculus and viceversa obtained by replacing inductively subterms of the form K M with x:M, for x 6 2 M. Such a translation yields immediately a new notion of conversion ! K on . One can easily see that ! KN and ! K are incomparable. On one hand ! KN can erase free variables.
On the other hand ! K can erase non strongly normalizing terms, consider e.g. the non-strongly normalizing -term: M ( xy:y)( x:( xy:y)x( x:xx)( x:xx)); which ! K -reduces to x:x. Hence, the K -calculus is incorrect w.r.t. p .
It is rather problematic to model adequately the K -calculus using semantical tools, since the K -reduction discriminates between open and closed terms. The behaviour of the term M, introduced above, clearly indicates that standard interpretations of K in strict extensional -lattices are not satisfactory. In order to overcome these di culties, one has two alternatives. One could either consider non-standard interpretations of K , sensitive to the nature of the second argument, within models where it never occurs that for all environments the interpretation of an open term is less than that of a closed term. Or else, one could consider spaces of doubly strict functions, i.e. functions which map the bottom element to the bottom element and the top element to the top element, provided they are not the least function. To give an idea of the intricacies of modeling the K -calculus, we just point out that, if ! p K is any perpetual strategy for it, we have that p K 6 = app p K . Consider again the term M, introduced above, we have M app p K x:x but M 6 p K x:x.
The KN -calculus.
The congruence p is a maximal (non-trivial) theory of the KN -calculus.
I.e. it is a maximal (non-trivial) congruence closed under ! KN -conversion. Assume, in fact, that there is a proper extension T of p . Then, since p = app p , there exist terms M and N such that (M; N) 2 T and M + p but N * p . Hence, given any P and Q we have P = T ( x:P)M = T ( x:P)N = T ( x:Q)N = T ( x:Q)M = T Q:
Suitably modifying the technique used in 6], Theorem 2.4.3, one can show that the KN -calculus satis es the SN property in the sense of B ohm and Intrigila. And suitably modifying the technique used in 6], Theorem 2.4.4, one can show also that B ohm's Theorem can be extended to the KN -calculus, in the sense that -normal forms can be separated by terms of the KN -calculus. Full separability for p is problematic since there are syntactically di erent normal forms under KN -reduction which are nonetheless equal in p . Consider e.g.:
x: ( yzw:w)(x( x:x))(x( x:x)) and x: ( yz:z)(x( x:x)):
Exact conditions for computational adequacy in general.
Necessary and su cient conditions, in the style of those in Theorem 29, can be given also for other notions of reduction, e.g. those in 11]. We do not elaborate on these here for lack of space.
Open questions and conjectures.
We conclude this paper with a short list of conjectures:
(i) Fully abstract models for p can be found in appropriate categories of games.
( 
